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Article: 
It has been almost fifty years since J. L. Austin made his famous plea for excuses before an 
audience of the Aristotelian Society.
1
 Austin's plea was not that we recognize the possibility of 
having an excuse for wrongful behavior; he took this possibility for granted. His plea was that 
we recognize how fruitful a careful study of excuses, or rather of the language of excuses, can be 
when one is investigating the nature of action and of responsibility. By way of demonstration of 
this fact, his essay meanders thoughtfully through the terrain of accident, carelessness, 
impulsiveness, inadvertence, negligence, recklessness, and the like, tarrying intermittently at ne-
glected sites and revealing unsuspected nuances. 
 
According to Austin, one has an excuse for what one has done just in case one's action was 
morally wrong but one is not morally culpable for it.
2
 There is reason to think that this view is 
too narrow, since it seems that excuses are sometimes tendered even when wrongdoing is not 
admitted. (Alf may blame Bert for having let Charlie suffer needlessly. Bert may rebut the ac-
cusation, that is, proffer an excuse, by pointing out that he was unable to relieve Charlie's 
suffering. In so doing, Bert clearly need not be admitting any wrongdoing.) But this point will 
not be pursued here; the focus of the paper will be on the possibility of doing moral wrong 
without being morally culpable. (Henceforth, the "moral(ly)" will be omitted, although it will 
always be implicit.) Austin's assumption that this possibility exists has been challenged. In what 
follows, the assumption will be defended. The defense will furnish a fresh plea for excuses, one 
that is in a way more fundamental than that which Austin made. 
 
Part I 
In Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, R. Jay Wallace devotes a full chapter to a discussion 
of the way in which excuses operate.
3
 He begins by "recalling" Austin's distinction between 
justifications and excuses, but his account of this distinction is not the usual one. He says (p. 
120): 
 
Suppose that agent s apparently does x, where x is an act that is, on the face of it, morally 
wrong. Austin suggests that a justification for s's act would grant that s did x, but try to 
adduce reasons for thinking that x is not morally wrong after all. . . . An excuse, by 
contrast, would grant that x is morally wrong but adduce reasons for thinking that s did 
not really do x after all. 
 
Whereas this accords with what Austin says about justifications, it would appear to contradict his 
view of excuses, according to which, if s has an excuse for doing x, then s did indeed do x (and, 
moreover, x was wrong). However, Wallace goes on to modify what he says about Austin's ac-
count on the next page, saying (p. 121): 
 
Granting that x would be morally wrong, excuses, on Austin's interpretation, apparently 
show that agent s did not really do x intentionally: s may have made the bodily move-
ments that normally constitute x-ing, but without the attitudinal conditions (whatever they 
are) that turn such bodily movements into cases of doing x intentionally. 
 
Well, did s do x, albeit unintentionally, or not? Here is Wallace's answer (pp. 123-24): 
 
Of course, ifs did not do x intentionally, then there is a clear sense in which there is no 
action that s performed at all; precisely because s did not do x intentionally, we may 
conclude that x was not really something that s did. 
 
This seems at best an exaggeration. Although it may be agreed that there is no action, in the 
relevant sense, in the absence of the agent's making some choice (so that, for example, whereas 
normal hand-raisings are actions, those produced in the throes of an epileptic seizure are not), 
what follows is only that all actions are intentional under some description,
4
 and not that all 
actions are intentional under all descriptions. But there is no need to press this point. One can 
simply understand Wallace to be maintaining that, if s did not intentionally do x, then s is not to 
blame for doing x. The issue to be addressed is what implications this view about excuses has 
regarding wrongdoing. 
 
Wallace appears to assume (very reasonably, it may seem) that wrongdoing consists in the 
violation of an obligation. Concerning such violation, he has this to say (p. 128): 
 
Only if an action expresses a choice of some sort can we say that a moral obligation has 
either been violated or complied with. Consider the moral obligation of nonmaleficence, 
for instance: this is not simply an obligation not to make bodily movements that harm 
other people. Rather it is an obligation not to act in ways that express the choice to harm 
other people, in the ordinary pursuit of one's ends. 
 
He continues (p. 133): 
 
[T]he obligation of nonmaleficence . . . must be construed as an obligation not to make 
bodily movements that harm someone, as the result of a choice to bring about such harm. 
Now if s makes a movement that harms someone (treading on another's hand, say), but it 
turns out that s did not tread on the person's hand intentionally, then what s did will not 
constitute a case of harming someone as the result of a choice to bring about such harm. 
Hence s will not have breached the obligation of nonmaleficence. 
 
One can thus understand Wallace to be maintaining that, if s did not intentionally do x, then s did 
not wrongly do x. 
 
The claim that intentionally doing x is necessary both for being to blame for doing x and for 
wrongly doing x does not, of course, imply that one cannot have an excuse for wrongdoing; for it 
could be that something else is also necessary for culpability that is not necessary for wrongdo-
ing. However, Wallace characterizes his view in just such terms. He says (p. 127) that "excuses 
serve to show that an agent has not really done anything wrong." (He repeats this claim on p. 
135.) Even if the passages that have been quoted do not themselves entail this conclusion, they 
may seem to point in its direction. Is the conclusion acceptable? 
 
Part II 
It may seem easy to dismiss Wallace's remarks, for surely intentionally doing x is not necessary 
either for culpability or for wrongdoing regarding x. What about negligence in doing x? What 
about recklessness? But Wallace is well aware of these phenomena. He says (pp. 138-139): 
 
Both negligence and recklessness ean be taken to reflect qualities of will, as expressed in 
action, and so to be appropriate grounds for blame. . . . But the qualities displayed when 
negligence or recklessness leads to x are different from those involved in intentionally 
doing x. Recklessness . . . involves a cavalier attitnde toward risk that shows itself in the 
relation between one's choice and one's awareness of the risk in acting on that choice . . . , 
and so recklessness can itself be a blameworthy quality of will. Negligence and 
forgetfulness are slightly harder cases, perhaps, because there may not even be awareness 
of the risks involved at the time when one acts negligently or forgetfully. Here one may 
have to trace the moral fault to an earlier episode of choice. . . . In this way, negligence 
and forgetfulness may also be traced to a blameworthy quality of will. 
 
Here Wallace seems to be saying that acting negligently typically involves, not doing something 
that is itself either intentional or reckless, but rather doing something that is a consequence of 
some earlier action that was either intentional or reckless. (This sort of "historic" approach to 
negligence and related phenomena is both popular and plausible.
5
) So understood, the passage 
just quoted constitutes a sensible amendment to Wallace's thesis, so that his considered view 
regarding both culpability and wrongdoing may now be put as follows: if s did not do x either 
intentionally or recklessly, then s is not to blame for doing x and did not wrongly do x, unless s's 
doing x was itself the consequence of some prior action, y, which s did either intentionally or 
recklessly. Once again, then, one can understand Wallace as identifying a condition that is 
common to both culpability and wrongdoing and thereby pointing toward the view that one 
cannot have an excuse for wrongdoing. 
 
Part III 
As already mentioned, the passages from Wallace's book that have been cited do not suffice for 
the view that excuses preclude wrongdoing. Nor do there appear to be any other passages in his 
book that do so. But his remarks are suggestive and invite supplementation in such a way that the 
view may be explicitly derived. Wallace might not endorse the following amplification of his 
remarks; nonetheless, the argument to be presented perhaps constitutes the strongest argument 
available for the view in question. Undermining it will serve to provide indirect support for the 
traditional account of excuses, according to which one can indeed have an excuse for 
wrongdoing. 
 
The argument begins as follows.
6
 Let us suppose that 
 
(1) Jane opened her front door and her doing so was wrong. 
 
Then there are two possibilities: 
 




(3) If Jane did believe that her opening the door was wrong, then she is culpable for opening it 
and thus has no excuse for opening it. 
 
On the other hand, if Jane did not have this belief, two further possibilities arise. More 
particularly, 
 
(4) If Jane did not believe that her opening the door was wrong, then either she is culpable for 




(5) If Jane is culpable for her failure to believe that her opening the door was wrong, then she is 




(6) Jane has an excuse for opening the door only if she inculpably failed to believe that her 
opening it was wrong. 
 
Let us interrupt the argument at this point. Premise (1) is required to set the scene, and premises 
(2) and (4) are clearly true. But what about premises (3) and (5)? Should we agree, first of all, 
that wrongdoing coupled with a belief that one is doing wrong suffices for culpability for one's 
action? Let us concede that we should. It is commonly held that one can be culpable for an action 
only if the action was free, but it is plausible to contend that this condition is already satisfied by 
the stipulation in premise (1) that Jane's opening the door was wrong, in that, if one cannot help 
doing what one does, one at most does something bad rather than something wrong.
7
 Should we 
agree, next, that wrongdoing coupled with a culpable failure to believe that one is doing wrong 
suffices for culpability for one's action? Again, let us concede that we should. The culpability 
will be indirect, by way of culpability for one's mental state, but indirect culpability for 
something is culpability all the same. (This fits well with Wallace's comment about tracing the 
moral fault associated with negligence or forgetfulness back to some earlier episode of choice. 
Even if premise (5) were denied, the wrongness of opening the door is ex hypothesi conjoined 
with Jane's culpability for something—her mental state, if not her action—and so such a case 
clearly does not provide an instance of wrongdoing unaccompanied by any sort of culpability.) 
 
Part IV 
Let us therefore grant the argument's first conclusion, that excuses for wrongdoing are possible 
only if one did wrong while inculpably failing to believe that one was doing wrong. In order to 
see where the argument goes from here, let us focus on a particular case in which an agent 
inculpably fails to believe that her action is wrong. Consider Jane again, who is about to enter 
her house. Let us now imagine that, without her knowledge, some terrorists have sabotaged her 
front door, rigging it so that, if someone opens it, a bomb will explode and the occupants of the 
house will be killed. Jane does not, and has no reason to, believe that it would be wrong for her 
to open the door. Accordingly, she opens the door, killing all the occupants.
8
 Was her opening 
the door in fact wrong? 
 
Holding all else "equal," a consequentialist would say "Yes." But that is not news. Nor is it news 
that this is an answer that is not immediately appealing. On the contrary, beginning students of 
philosophy often respond to cases such as Jane's by asking, "How could it be morally wrong for 
someone to cause a disaster completely by accident?" G. E. Moore would diagnose a confusion 
on their part between ascriptions of wrongdoing and ascriptions of blameworthiness,
9
 but even 
seasoned philosophers whose intuitions about such matters have been blunted over the years 
might well sympathize more with the students' position than with Moore's. The argument being 
considered here supports this stance. It resumes with the assumption that 
 
(7) Jane inculpably failed to believe that her opening the door was wrong. 
 
It is then observed that 
 
(8) If Jane inculpably failed to believe that her opening the door was wrong, then she did not 




(9) If Jane did not wrongly lack the belief that her opening the door was wrong, then her opening 




(10) If Jane's opening the door did not constitute the violation of any (alleged) obligation not to 




(11) Jane's opening the door was not wrong after all. 
 
Coupled with the intermediate conclusion that 
 
(6) Jane has an excuse for opening the door only if she inculpably failed to believe that her 
opening it was wrong, 
 
the upshot (generalized) is, of course, that one cannot do wrong and have an excuse for doing so. 
If this conclusion is to be rejected, then, since (6) has been accepted, fault must be found with at 
least one of premises (8)—(10). And so it will. Each of the premises may seem attractive, but in 
fact each is problematic. 
 
Consider (8), the first of the premises in question. It must of course be agreed that, if in general 
one could not have an excuse for wrongful behavior, then in particular one could not have an 
excuse for wrongly lacking a belief about wrongdoing (on the assumption that lacking such a 
belief constitutes behavior of the sort covered by the general thesis). But the general thesis is 
precisely what is at issue, and so it cannot be used to support the more particular thesis. 
Moreover, it is not at all clear what other reason might be given in support of the latter. Indeed, a 
proponent of the view that there can be excuses for wrongful behavior in general is likely to want 
to insist that there can indeed be an excuse for wrongly lacking a belief about wrongdoing. 
 
Thus there is a sticking point right at the start. But let us move beyond this, for an examination of 
the remaining premises will prove instructive. Consider (9). Did Jane violate any obligation not 
to open the door? Wallace would deny that she did, precisely because she lacked the requisite 
mental state. There is undoubtedly something to this. Just as it is odd to say that someone can 
comply with an obligation by accident, so too it seems odd to say that someone can violate an 
obligation by accident. Both compliance and violation seem to require some sort of relation 
between the agent's mental state and her action. More particularly, we might say this: s complies 
with an obligation not to do x if and only if s is obligated not to do x and intentionally does not 
do x; s violates an obligation not to do x if and only if s is obligated not to do x and either 
intentionally or recklessly or negligently does x. On this account, Jane certainly did not violate 
any obligation not to harm the occupants of the house, since she neither intentionally nor 
recklessly nor negligently did so. It might be pointed out that she nonetheless did intentionally 
open the door, so that we could still say that she violated the obligation not to do that. But this 
doesn't seem right. The (alleged) obligation not to open the door was wholly derivative from the 
obligation of nonmaleficence. This being the case, nonviolation of the latter should suffice for 
nonviolation of the former (an observation that might require a revision to the account of viola-
tion just suggested). 
 
Premise (9) thus seems quite plausible. If one accepts both it and (8), though, it may seem that 
one should indeed conclude that excuses preclude wrongdoing. For the sole remaining premise, 
(10), may seem trivially true: no violation, no wrongdoing. But here one must be very careful. 
Even if it is agreed that Jane did not violate an obligation not to open the door, the question still 
remains whether she failed to meet such an obligation. The account of violation just suggested 
provides for exactly this possibility; for, if s is obligated not to do x but does x nonetheless, then 
surely s does indeed fail to meet the obligation not to do x, even if he does not violate this obliga-
tion because he does x neither intentionally nor recklessly nor negligently. This is a possibility 
that Wallace seems committed to denying when he says that the obligation of nonmaleficence is 
not merely the obligation not to harm but the obligation not to harm "as a result of a choice to 
bring about such harm." But this is surely contentious. Again, one might agree that someone who 
has harmed another by accident has not violated the obligation of nonmaleficence, but why agree 
that she has done no wrong? Consider Jane. She eould easily have refrained from opening the 
door and thus easily have avoided killing the occupants of the house. Why, then, deny that she 
did wrong in acting as she did? 
 
One response to this question is this. For s's doing x to be wrong, s must have a reason not to do 
x; Jane had no reason not to open the door; hence, her opening it was not wrong. 
 
This won't do. The phrase "to have a reason" is ambiguous. In one sense, to have a reason to do 
something is to have a motive to do it. Now, Jane had no motive not to open the door, and so she 
indeed had no reason in this sense not to open it. In another sense, however, to have a reason to 
do something is simply for there to be a consideration in favor of one's doing it. One need not be 
aware of this consideration, let alone be motivated by it, in order for such a consideration to 
exist. In this sense, it may be insisted, Jane did have a (moral) reason—indeed, a conclusive rea-
son—not to open the door, and it is for this reason that her opening it was (morally) wrong. In 
general, one need not be motivated to perform an action in order to be obligated to perform it. 
(Think how easy it would otherwise be to avoid being burdened with any obligations! Apathy 
would be the perfect liberator.) 
 
But, it might be retorted, it is not as if Jane lacked a motive that she should have had. On the 
contrary, premise (8) acknowledges that she did not wrongly lack the belief that her opening the 
door was wrong. How can she have been obligated to act on the basis of a belief that she did not 
have and was not obligated to have? She cannot, and she therefore did no wrong after all.  
 
This won't do either. To say that Jane was obligated not to open the door is not to say that she 
was obligated to refrain, on the basis of some particular belief, from opening it. A fortiori, it is 
not to say that she was obligated to refrain, on the basis of the belief that she would or might 
thereby harm someone, from opening it. It is simply to say that she was obligated not to open it, 
period. This is something she could easily have managed. In general, our obligations are a 
function of the things that we can do and of the reasons that there are for doing them, not of the 
reasons that we believe there are for doing them. 
 
But how, it might be asked, can Jane be expected to have satisfied an obligation of which she 
was unaware and had no obligation to be aware? The answer depends on what is meant by 
"expected." If this means the same as "obligated," then the questioner seems to be presupposing 
that one cannot be under an obligation of which one is unaware and has no reason to be aware. 
But why accept this? Conscientious people are frequently concerned with discovering whether 
they are under any obligations of which they are currently unaware, even ones of which they 
currently have no reason to be aware. Such a concern is surely coherent, indeed admirable. If, 
instead, "be expected to have satisfied" means the same as "be culpable for not having satisfied," 
the answer is that Jane cannot be expected to have satisfied the obligation not to open the door. 
That's precisely what gives her an excuse for opening it! 
 
The assessment of premises (8)–(10), in sum, is this. Premise (8) is unpersuasive; the only 
apparent rationale for it begs the question regarding whether excuses preclude wrongdoing. 
Premise (9) may perhaps be granted, on a rich understanding of "violate" according to which not 
every failure to meet an obligation is tantamount to a violation of it; but then (10) is to be 
rejected, since the failure to meet an obligation constitutes wrongdoing, regardless of whether it 
amounts to a violation. If, however, "violate" is understood simply to mean the same as "fail to 
meet," then (10) must be accepted; but then (9) is to be rejected, since one need not be aware of 
the wrong that one does. 
 
Part V 
It should be stressed that the evaluation of the argument just considered does not rest on the view 
that Jane did wrong in opening the door. As noted above, a consequentialist such as Moore 
would say that she did, but many are uneasy with this verdict. Some would rather say that 
wrongdoing is a function of the risks that one runs. If we assume that Jane ran a very low risk of 
causing any harm in opening the door, then there is perhaps good reason to say that her opening 
it was indeed not wrong after all. But this provides no support for the argument. Still (8) would 
be question-begging, and still either (9) or (10) would founder on the fact that one need not be 
aware of the wrong that one does. Suppose that we alter Jane's case so that there was evidence 
available to her that the door was rigged and that opening it would likely cause harm to the 
occupants of the house. Then, on the present view, there will once again be good reason to say 
that her opening the door was wrong. Must we also say that she is to blame for opening it? 
Surely not. She may not have recognized the risk that she ran and, as long as her failure to 
recognize it was inculpable, then she is not to blame for running it even though her doing so was 
wrong. How could her failure to recognize the risk be inculpable? In any number of ways. 
Perhaps she was momentarily distracted by an ambulance siren; perhaps she was on medication; 
perhaps she had just received some distressing news; perhaps… 
 
It may be responded a la Wallace that the correct criterion for wrongdoing implies, not that it is 
wrong to cause harm or to risk causing harm, but that it is wrong to do so while in a certain state 
of mind.
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 There are good reasons for rejecting this view,
11
 but there is no need to discuss them 
here. The fact is that, unless one very particular mental state is at issue, still a "gap" between 
wrongdoing and culpability must be acknowledged. Suppose it were said that it is only the 
witting causing of harm that is wrong. Still one must distinguish between wittingly causing harm 
and wittingly doing wrong. The gap between wrongdoing and culpability exists because 
culpability is a function of one's attitude toward wrongdoing. This gap could be closed only by 
insisting that wrongdoing itself requires an attitude toward wrongdoing. While this thesis has 
been proposed by some,
12
 it is surely fraught with problems. As long as one resists it—and the 
argument considered above gives no reason not to do so—one may continue to maintain the 




Many thanks to Ishtiyaque Haji and Eduardo Rivera Lopez for helpful comments on previous 
drafts. 
1. Austin (1956-57). All page references are to the reprinted version. 
2. Ibid., p. 20. This way of putting his position regiments it somewhat. He talks on p. 19 in terms 
of an action's being "bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some other of the numerous possible 
ways untoward," and of responsibility in general rather than moral culpability in particular. The 
regimentation provides focus. 
3. Wallace (1994), chap. 5. 
4. Or, to put the point in a way that does not presuppose a coarsely-grained individuation of 
actions: whenever one acts, one acts intentionally. 
5. See, for example, Smith (1983), Zimmerman (1986) and (1997a), and Alexander (1990). 
6. This argument is inspired in part by passages in Wallace (1994), but mostly by Rivera Lopez 
(forthcoming). 
7. Someone who distinguishes between culpability and wrongdoing may agree that each requires 
a sort of freedom and yet maintain that these sorts differ. This may be so, but the point will not 
be pursued here, since the aim is to see whether there are other reasons for separating culpability 
from wrongdoing. 
8. This case is borrowed from Rivera Lopez, op. cit. 
9. Moore (1912), chap. 5. 
10. Cf. Prichard (1949), chap. 2, and Ross (1939), chap. 7, on such a "subjective" approach to 
obligation and wrongdoing. 
11. Cf. McConnell (1988). 
12. Cf. Strawson (1986), p. 220. 
13. Excuses reflect just one aspect of the gap between wrongdoing and culpability. Another, 
complementary aspect is explored in Zimmerman (1997b). 
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